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Abstract. The code equivalence problem is to decide whether two lin-
ear codes over Fq are identical up to a linear isometry of the Hamming
space. In this paper, we review the hardness of code equivalence over Fq
due to some recent negative results and argue on the possible implica-
tions in code-based cryptography. In particular, we present an improved
version of the three-pass identification scheme of Girault and discuss on a
connection between code equivalence and the hidden subgroup problem.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this work is to examine the applications of the worst-case and
average-case hardness of the Code Equivalence problem to the field of code-
based cryptography. The latter problem is, given the generator matrices of two
q-ary linear codes, how hard is it to decide whether or not these codes are
identical up to an isometry of Hamming space? The support splitting algorithm
(SSA) [1] runs in polynomial time for all but a negligible proportion of all linear
codes, and solves the latter problem by recovering the isometry when it is just
a permutation of the code support.
The McEliece public-key cryptosystem [2] and Girault’s zero-knowledge pro-
tocol [3], both candidates for post-quantum cryptography, are related to the
hardness of permutationally equivalent linear codes. For the McEliece cryptosys-
tem, the SSA is able to detect some weak keys but a polynomial attack is in-
feasible due to the large number of possible private keys. However, the security
of Girault’s zero-knowledge protocol is severely weakened and cannot longer be
used with random codes but only with weakly self-dual codes (the hard instances
of SSA).
Recently in [4], the worst-case and average-case hardness of code equivalence
over Fq was studied and it was shown that in practice, SSA could be extended
for q ∈ {3, 4}, and similarly solve all but an exponentially small proportion of the
instances in polynomial time, when isometries are under consideration. However,
for any fixed q ≥ 5, the problem seems to be intractable for almost all instances.
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In light of these new results, we repair Girault’s zero-knowledge protocol
over Fq, when q ≥ 5, by showing that random codes are again a viable option.
Moreover, the context of the framework built in [5] suggests that codes with large
automorphism groups resist quantum Fourier sampling as long as permutation
equivalence is considered. We examine whether it is possible to extend these
results, when a more general notion of code equivalence over Fq is taken into
account, in particular when the equivalence mapping is an isometry and not just
a permutation of the code support.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we define the different no-
tions of equivalence of linear codes over Fq when isometries are considered, while
in section 3 we formally define the Code Equivalence problem and present
a thorough analysis of its hardness. In section 4 we review the protocol of Gi-
rault together with its weakness and repair its security using results based on
the hardness of code equivalence, while in the last section we elaborate on the
connection between code equivalence over Fq and the quantum Fourier sampling.
2 Equivalence of Linear Codes over Fq
Code equivalence is a basic concept in coding theory with several applications
in code-based cryptography; the McEliece public-key cryptosystem [2], Girault’s
identification scheme [3] and the CFS signature scheme [6], to name a few. The
notion of equivalence of linear codes used in code-based cryptography usually
involves only permutations as the code alphabet is the binary field. However, this
is by far the case in coding theory where for a more general notion of equivalence
all isometries of the Hamming space have to be included. In this section, we
review the concept of what it means for codes to be “essentially different” by
considering the metric Hamming space together with its isometries, which are
the maps preserving the metric structure. This in turn will lead to a rigorous
definition of equivalence of linear codes and as we shall see later on may provide
additional applications in cryptography. In fact, we will call codes isometric if
they are equivalent as subspaces of the Hamming space.
2.1 Three Notions of Equivalence
Let Fq be a finite field of cardinality q = p
r, where the prime number p is its
characteristic, and r is a positive integer. As usual, a linear [n, k] code C is a
k-dimensional subspace of the finite vector space Fnq and its elements are called
codewords. We consider all vectors, as row vectors. Therefore, an element υ of
F
n
q is of the form υ := (υ1, . . . , υn). It can also be regarded as the mapping υ
from the set In = {1, . . . , n} to Fq defined by υ(i) := υi. The Hamming distance
(metric) on Fnq is the following mapping,
d : Fnq × F
n
q → N : (x, y) 7→ d(x, y) :=| {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} | xi 6= yi} | .
The pair (Fnq , d) is a metric space, called the Hamming space of dimension n
over Fq, denoted by H(n, q). The Hamming weight w(x) of a codeword x ∈ C is
simply the number of its non-zero coordinates, i.e. w(x) := d(x, 0).
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It is well-known due to a theorem of MacWilliams that any isometry between
linear codes preserving the weight of the codewords induces an equivalence for
codes [7]. Therefore, two codes C,C ′ are of the same quality if there exists a
mapping ι : Fnq 7→ F
n
q with ι(C) = C
′ which preserves the Hamming distance,
i.e. d(υ, υ′) = d(ι(υ), ι(υ′)), for all υ, υ′ ∈ Fnq . Mappings with the latter property
are called the isometries of H(n, q), and the two codes C and C ′ will be called
isometric. Clearly, isometric codes have the same error-correction capabilities,
and obvious permutations of the coordinates are isometries. We write Sn for
the symmetric group acting on the set In, equipped with the composition of
permutations.
Definition 1. Two linear codes C,C ′ ⊆ Fnq will be called permutationally equiv-
alent1, and will be denoted as C
PE
∼ C ′, if there exists a permutation σ ∈ Sn
that maps C onto C ′, i.e. C ′ = σ(C) = {σ(x) | x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ C} where
σ(x) = σ(x1, . . . , xn) := (xσ−1(1), . . . , xσ−1(n)).
Note also that the use of σ−1 in the index is consisted as we have σ(π(C)) =
σ ◦ π(C). This can easily be seen by considering x ∈ C, and σ, π ∈ Sn such
that σ(π(x)) = σ((xπ−1(i))i∈In). Let yi = xπ−1(i), i ∈ In. Then σ(π(x)) =
σ((yi)i∈In) = (yσ−1(i))i∈In = (xπ−1σ−1(i))i∈In = (x(σπ)−1(i))i∈In = σ ◦ π(x).
Moreover, there is a particular subgroup of Sn that maps C onto itself, the
permutation group of C defined as PAut(C) := {C = σ(C) | σ ∈ Sn}. PAut(C)
always contains the identity permutation. If it does not contain any other ele-
ment, we will say that it is trivial.
Recall, that we defined two codes to be isometric if there exists an isometry that
maps one into another. Isometries that are linear2, are called linear isometries.
Therefore, we can obtain a more general notion of equivalence for codes induced
by linear isometries of Fq. Moreover, it can be shown that any linear isometry
between two linear codes C,C ′ ⊆ Fnq can always be extended to an isometry of
F
n
q [8].
The group of all linear isometries of H(n, q) corresponds to the semidirect
product of F∗q
n and Sn, F
∗
q
n
⋊ Sn = {(υ;π) | υ : In 7→ F
∗
q , π ∈ Sn}, called the
monomial group of degree n over F∗q , where the multiplication within this group
is defined by
(υ;π)(υ′;π′) = (υυ′π, ππ
′) and (υυ′π)i := υiυ
′
π−1(i) (1)
where F∗q denotes the multiplicative group of Fq. Hence, any linear isometry ι
can be expressed as a pair of mappings (υ;π) ∈ F∗q
n
⋊ Sn. Note that, some
authors [8–10], describe this group as the wreath product F∗q ≀nSn. The action of
the latter group in an element of Fnq is translated into an equivalence for linear
codes.
1 This definition can also met as permutationally isometric codes in the literature, see
[8].
2 For all u, v ∈ Fnq we have ι(u+ v) = ι(u) + ι(v) and ι(0) = 0.
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Definition 2. Two linear codes C,C ′ ⊆ Fnq will be called linearly or monomially
equivalent, and will be denoted as C
LE
∼ C ′, if there exists a linear isometry
ι = (υ;σ) ∈ F∗q
n
⋊ Sn that maps C onto C
′, i.e. C ′ = (υ;σ)(C) = {(υ;σ)(x) |
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ C} where (υ;σ)(x1, . . . , xn) := (υ1xσ−1(1), . . . , υnxσ−1(n)).
If q = pr is not a prime, then the Frobenius automorphism τ : Fq → Fq, x 7→
xp applied on each coordinate of Fnq preserves the Hamming distance, too. More-
over, for n ≥ 3, the isometries of Fnq which map subspaces onto subspaces are
exactly the semilinear mappings3 of the form (υ; (α, π)), where (υ;π) is a linear
isometry and α is a field automorphism, i.e. α ∈ Aut(Fq) (c.f. [8, 11]). All these
mappings form the group of semilinear isometries of H(n, q) which is isomorphic
to the semidirect product F∗q
n
⋊ (Aut(Fq) × Sn), where the multiplication of
elements is given by
(υ; (α, π))(ϕ; (β, σ)) := (υ · α(ϕπ); (αβ, πσ)) (2)
Moreover, there is a description of F∗q
n
⋊ (Aut(Fq)×Sn) as a generalized wreath
product F∗q ≀ ≀n(Aut(Fq) × Sn), see [8, 12, 11]. Clearly, the notion of semilinear
isometry which can be expressed as a group action on the set of linear subspaces
gives rise to the most general notion of equivalence for linear codes.
Definition 3. Two linear codes C,C ′ ⊆ Fnq will be called semilinearly equiv-
alent, and will be denoted as C
SLE
∼ C ′, if there exists a semilinear isometry
(υ; (α, σ)) ∈ F∗q
n
⋊(Aut(Fq)×Sn) that maps C onto C
′, i.e. C ′ = (υ; (α, σ))(C) =
{(υ; (α, σ))(x) | (xi)i∈In ∈ C} where (υ; (α, σ))(x1, . . . , xn) = (υ1α(xσ−1(1)),
. . . , υnα(xσ−1(n))).
Finally, we can define the monomial group of C as MAut(C) := {C =
(υ;σ)(C) | (υ;σ) ∈ F∗q
n
⋊ Sn} and the automorphism group of C as Aut(C) :=
{C = (υ; (α, σ))(C) | (υ; (α, σ)) ∈ F∗q
n
⋊ (Aut(Fq) × Sn)} where their elements
map each codeword of C to another codeword of C, under the respective actions
of the involved groups. For more details, on automorphism groups of linear codes
we refer to [13]. In addition, we remark the following:
1. When Fq = F2 the group of linear isometries of H(n, 2) is isomorphic to Sn,
therefore all notions of equivalence are the same.
2. The group of semilinear isometries of H(n, q) is the same as the group of
linear isometries if and only if q is a prime (since Aut(Fq) is trivial if and
only if q is a prime). Therefore, semilinear equivalence reduces to linear
equivalence for prime fields, and is different for all other cases.
3 The Code Equivalence Problem
For efficient computation of codes we represent them with generator matrices.
A k × n matrix G over Fq, is called a generator matrix for the [n, k] linear code
3 σ : Fnq → F
n
q is semilinear if there exists α ∈ Aut(Fq) such that for all u, v ∈ F
n
q and
k ∈ Fq we have σ(u+ v) = σ(u) + σ(v) and σ(ku) = α(k)σ(u).
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C if the rows of G form a basis for C, so that C = {xG | x ∈ Fkq}. In general, a
linear code possess many different bases, and it is clear from linear algebra that
the set of all generator matrices for C can be reached by {SG | S ∈ GLk(q)},
where GLk(q) is the group of all k × k invertible matrices over Fq.
For any σ ∈ Sn associate by Pσ = [pi,j ] the n × n matrix such that pi,j =
1 if σ(i) = j and pi,j = 0 otherwise, therefore Pσ is a permutation matrix.
Note that, the action of σ ∈ Sn on x ∈ F
n
q agrees with the ordinary matrix
multiplication. The permutation matrices form a subgroup ofMn(q), the set of all
n×nmonomial matrices over Fq, that is, matrices with exactly one nonzero entry
per row and column from Fq. If M = [mi,j ] ∈ Mn(q), then M = DP , where P is
a permutation matrix andD = [di,j ] = diag(d1, . . . , dn) is a diagonal matrix with
di = di,i = mi,j ifmi,j 6= 0 and di,j = 0 if i 6= j. There is an isomorphism between
diagonal matrices and F∗q
n, therefore we associate Dυ = diag(υ1, . . . , υn) for
υ = (υi)i∈In ∈ F
∗
q
n. Hence, we can map any linear isometry (υ;σ) ∈ F∗q
n
⋊Sn to a
monomial matrix M(υ;σ) = DυPσ ∈ Mn(q), and this mapping is an isomorphism
between F∗q
n
⋊Sn and Mn(q). Therefore, we can express the equivalence between
linear codes in terms of their generator matrices.
Problem 1. Given two k × n matrices G and G′ over Fq, whose rows span two
[n, k] linear codes C and C ′ over Fq, does there exist S ∈ GLk(q) and a monomial
matrix M(υ;σ) = DυPσ ∈ Mn(q) such that G
′ = SGDυPσ?
We will refer to the decidability of the previous problem, as the Linear Code
Equivalence problem. The Semi-Linear Code Equivalence problem can
be defined analogously by permitting the application of a field automorphism
in the columns of the scrambled generator matrix. In particular, we define the
following problem.
Problem 2. Given two k × n matrices G and G′ over Fq, whose rows span two
[n, k] linear codes C and C ′ over Fq, does there exist S ∈ GLk(q), a monomial
matrix M(υ;σ) = DυPσ ∈ Mn(q) and a field automorphism α ∈ Aut(Fq) such
that G′ = Sα(GDυPσ)?
3.1 The Hardness of Code Equivalence over Fq
In this section, we review the hardness of the code equivalence problem, therefore
we deem necessary to briefly mention the most significant results in terms of
complexity, for deciding it, and algorithms, for solving it.
When the linear isometry (υ;σ) is just a permutation, i.e. Dυ is equal to In,
we will call problem 1, as the Permutation Code Equivalence problem. The
latter problem, was introduced in [14], who showed that if Fq = F2 then it is
harder than theGraph Isomorphism, there exists a polynomial time reduction,
but not NP-complete unless P = NP. A different proof of this reduction is also
given in [11]. Recently, the reduction of [14] was generalized in [15] over any
field Fq, hence Permutation Code Equivalence is harder than the Graph
Isomorphism, for any field Fq. The latter problem, has been extensively studied
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for decades, but until now there is no polynomial-time algorithm for solving all
of its instances. Clearly, (Semi)-Linear Code Equivalence for any Fq cannot
be easier than the Graph Isomorphism, since it contains the Permutation
Code Equivalence as a subproblem.
Last but not least, we would like to mention that the McEliece public-key
cryptosystem [2] is related to the hardness of permutationally equivalent binary
linear codes. Towards this direction, another important complexity result was
shown in [5], that the Hidden Subgroup problem also reduces to Permuta-
tion Code Equivalence for any field Fq.
The Support Splitting Algorithm can be used as an oracle to decide whether two
binary codes are permutationally equivalent [1], as well as to retrieve the equiv-
alence mapping. Other notable algorithms for code equivalence can be found
in [16–18]. The main idea of SSA is to partition the support In of a code
C ⊆ Fn2 , into small sets that are fixed under operations of PAut(C). The algo-
rithm employs the concept of invariants and signatures, defined in [1]. Invariants
are mappings such that any two permutationally equivalent codes take the same
value, while signatures depends on the code and one of its positions.
Definition 4. A signature S over a set F maps a code C ⊆ Fnq and an ele-
ment i ∈ In into an element of F and is such that for all σ ∈ Sn, S(C, i) =
S(σ(C), σ(i)). Moreover, S is called discriminant for C if there exist i, j ∈ In
such that S(C, i) 6= S(C, j) and fully discriminant if this holds ∀ i, j ∈ In.
The fundamental idea of SSA is to be able to find a distinct property for
the code and one of its positions, and thus by labeling them accordingly it is
possible to recover the permutation between equivalent codes.
The main difficulty of the algorithm, is to obtain a fully discriminant signa-
ture, for as many codes as possible. In [1] it was shown that such a signature,
can be built from the weight enumerator of the hull of a code C, denoted by
H(C), and defined as the intersection of the code with its dual, H(C) = C ∩C⊥
[19], because the hull commutes with permutations4, H(σ(C)) = σ(H(C)), and
therefore is an invariant for permutation equivalence. The (heuristic) complexity
of SSA for an [n, k] code C is O(n3 + 2hn2 log n) where h is the dimension of
the hull [20, 1]. The first term is the cost of the Gaussian elimination needed
to compute the hull. The second term is the (conjectured) number of refine-
ments, log n, multiplied by the cost one refinement (n weight enumerators of
codes of dimension h and length n). Moreover, the cost of computing the weight
enumerator of an [n, h] code over Fq is proportional to nq
h operations in Fq [1].
In practice, for random codes, the hull has a small dimension with over-
whelming probability [21] and the dominant cost for the average case is O(n3).
Note that, the worst case occurs when the hull dimension is maximal; weakly
self-dual codes (C ⊂ C⊥) are equal to their hulls. Then the algorithm becomes
intractable with a complexity equal to O(2kn2 log n).
4 No such property exists in general for linear codes when (semi)-linear equivalence is
considered, because the dual of equivalent codes do not remain equivalent with the
same isometry as the original codes.
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Reduction of Linear Code Equivalence to Permutation Code Equivalence was
made possible via the introduction of the closure of a linear code in [4].
Definition 5. Let Fq = {a0, a1, . . . , aq−1}, with a0 = 0, and a linear code C ⊆
F
n
q . Define I
(n)
q−1 as the cartesian product of Iq−1×In. The closure C̃ of the code
C is a code of length (q − 1)n over Fq where,
C̃ = {(akxi)(k,i)∈I(n)
q−1
| (xi)i∈In ∈ C}.
Clearly, we see that every coordinate of the closure C̃, corresponds to a coor-
dinate position of a codeword of C multiplied by a nonzero element of Fq. Since,
the index (k, i) ∈ I
(n)
q−1 of a position of a codeword of the closure means that
k ∈ Iq−1 and i ∈ In, we have taken into account every possible multiplication
of xi with nonzero elements of Fq. The fundamental property of the closure is
realised in the following theorem, first given in [4].
Theorem 1. Let C,C ′ ⊆ Fnq . Then C and C
′ are linearly equivalent, i.e. C
LE
∼
C ′, if and only if C̃ and C̃ ′ are permutationally equivalent, i.e. C̃
PE
∼ C̃ ′.
Theorem 1 is of great importance, because it realizes a reduction from the
Linear Code Equivalence problem to the Permutation Code Equiva-
lence problem. Thus, we are able to decide if the codes C and C ′ are linearly
equivalent by checking their closures for permutation equivalence. Moreover, if
the closures are permutation equivalent then there exists an algorithmic pro-
cedure that allows the retrieval of the initial isometry between C and C ′ by
considering that a signature for an extension of SSA can be built from the
weight enumerator of the H(C̃).
Unfortunately, it turns out that the closure C̃ is a weakly self-dual code
for every q ≥ 5, considering both Euclidean and Hermitian duals, which are
exactly the hard instances of SSA [4]. Moreover, for F3 and F4 equipped with
the Euclidean and Hermitian inner product, respectively, the distribution of the
dimension of H(C̃) follows the distribution of the dimension H(C), since the
closure has the same dimension as C, and will be on average a small constant,
[21], except in the cases where C is also a weakly self-dual code. Therefore,
the Linear Code Equivalence problem can be decided (and solved) in poly-
onomial time using SSA only in F3 and F4, as long as the hull of the given
code is small (the worst-case being a weakly self-dual code). However, for q ≥ 5
its complexity growth becomes exponential for all instances. Moreover, it was
conjectured in [4], that for q ≥ 5, Code Equivalence is hard for almost all
instances. This argument, was further supported by some impossibility results
on the Tutte polynomial of a graph which corresponds to the weight enumerator
of a code [22]. To conclude with, we would like to make clear that the hardness
of the code equivalence arises from the absence of an easy computable invariant
not the inexistence of an algorithm.
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Table 1. Complexity estimates for SSA and its extension over Fq
Algorithm Field Random codes Weakly self-dual codes
(alphabet) (average-case) (worst-case)
SSA F2 O(n
3) O(2kn2 log n)
SSA extension F3 O(n
3) O(3kn2 log n)
SSA extension F4 O(n
3) O(22kn2 log n)
SSA extension Fq, q ≥ 5 O(q
kn2 log n) O(qkn2 log n)
4 Zero-Knowledge Protocols
A central concept in cryptography is zero-knowledge protocols. These protocols
allow a prover to convince a verifier that it knows a secret without the verifier
learning any information about the secret. In practice, this is used to allow one
party to prove its identity to another by proving it has a particular secret. For a
protocol to be zero-knowledge, no information can be revealed no matter what
strategy a so-called cheating verifier, simply cheater, follows when interacting
with the prover. Therefore, an important question is what happens to these
protocols when the cheater is a quantum computer. Are there any zero-knowledge
protocols sufficient to withstand such a powerful cheater in a post-quantum era?
In this section, we deal with protocols based on a particular type of alter-
native cryptography originating from error-correcting codes, called code-based
cryptography. In this emerging field of cryptography the underlying hard pro-
blems which pose as its security assumptions, decoding in a random linear code
and recovering the code structure, does not seem so far to be susceptible to at-
tacks mounted by quantum computers [20]. In addition, as we shall mention in
the following section there is a negative result regarding the connection between
coding theory and the Hidden Subgroup problem, which is the starting point
for designing efficient quantum algorithms.
The idea of using error-correcting codes for identification schemes is due
to Harari [23], followed by Stern (first protocol) [24] and Girault [3]. Harari’s
protocol was broken and the security of Girault’s one was severely weakened
(we shall explain this shortly after) while the protocol of Stern was five-pass and
unpractical. At Crypto’93, Stern proposed a new scheme [25], which is one of the
main references in this area. Recently, there has been an upsurge on designing
identification schemes mainly due to the work of several researchers [26–28],
where their efforts concentrated on both reducing the communication cost and
the probabibility of someone impersonating an honest prover.
4.1 Girault’s Three-Pass Identification Scheme
Girault’s identification scheme is a three-pass one with a cheating probability
of 1/2 (compared to the usual 2/3 of Stern’s protocol), and has the additional
advantage that all computations are performed on the standard model instead of
the random oracle model since there is no involmement of a hash function in the
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committments of the protocol. However, this advantage comes with a cost. At
each round of the protocol a large number of bits has to be transmitted, which
render the scheme unpractical. Its principle is as follows: Let H be an (n−k)×n
matrix over the binary field F2 common to all users. Each prover P has an n-bit
word e of small weight w randomly chosen by him and a public identifier He = s.
Clearly, when H is a parity-check matrix of a linear code, computing e from H
and s comes to finding a word of given small weight and given syndrome s, a
well-known NP-hard problem. When P needs to authenticate to a verifier V as
the owner of s, then P and V interact through the following scheme.
Step 1: P picks a random n × n permutation matrix P and a random k × k
non-singular matrix S. P computes H ′ = SHP and s′ = Ss, and sends H ′
and s′ to V.
Step 2: V generates a random bit c ∈ {0, 1} and sends it to P.
Step 3a: If c = 0, P replies by delivering S, P to V, who checks that SHP = H ′
and Ss = s′.
Step 3b: If c = 1, P replies by delivering e′ = P−1e to V, who checks that the
weight of e′ is w and H ′e′ = s′.
The protocol is a multi-round one as it has to be repeated t times to reach
a security level of 1 − (1/2)t and was proved to be zero-knowledge on [3]. Its
security is based on the hardness of two well-known problems in coding theory.
The first one is the Binary Syndrome Decoding problem shown to be NP-
complete in the worst case [29], but it is also widely believed that for the average
case it still remains hard. The other assumption is related to the hardness of the
Permutation Code Equivalence problem over the binary field since from
the knowledge of H and H ′ someone must not be able to recover the scrambing
matrix S and the permutation matrix P , as this would lead to information
leakage about the secret key of P. However, as we extensively discussed on
section 3, SSA can recover the matrix P in (almost) polynomial time when the
underlying code is chosen at random (see also the complexity figures in table 3),
and then using elementary linear algebra the matrix S can also be found.
Still, the protocol can be used with weakly self-dual codes, the instances of
Permutation Code Equivalence that the growth of SSA becomes expone-
ntial, however there is no significant advantage on decoding with self-dual codes
and in addition this restrict too much the possibilities for the public key.
4.2 Improved Version of the Girault Protocol
We now consider, Girault’s identification scheme in a q-ary setting. That is,
the underlying finite field, will no longer be the binary field but the field Fq
with q elements. For the security assumptions of the scheme we first have to
consider syndrome decoding over Fq. We define the decisional version of the
q-ary Syndrome Decoding problem, below,
Problem 3. Given an m × n matrix H over Fq, a target vector s ∈ F
m
q and an
integer w > 0 does there exist a vector x ∈ Fnq of weight ≤ w such that Hx = s?
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which was also proven to be NP-complete in [30]. There are two main families
of algorithms for solving the latter problem: Information Set Decoding (ISD)
and (Generalized) Birthday algorithm (GBA). ISD has the lowest complexity of
the two, and in a recent work [31] the complexity of a generalization of Stern’s
algorithm from [32] is analyzed which permits the decoding of linear codes over
arbitrary finite fields Fq. For a general treatment of the topic we refer to [20],
while for the security of the scheme it is sufficient to consider that all known
decoding attacks have an exponential cost on the code length.
Moreover, in an attempt to repair the security of the scheme we consider
the (semi)-linear code equivalence instead of the permutation code equivalence,
depending on whether Fq is a prime field or not. As one of the purposes of this
paper, is to state the implications of the hardness of the (Semi)-Linear Code
equivalence problem for designing cryptographic primitives, we choose the
parameter q to be at least equal to 5, since we strongly believe that a random
instance of the latter problem is hard for these cases (see also section 3).
The starting point of this improved version of Girault’s scheme is the same
as in the original one, with the expection that all operations now occur over Fq,
q ≥ 5. Let H be an (n− k)×n matrix over Fq common to all users. Each prover
P has an n-bit word e of small weight w randomly chosen by him and a public
identifier He = s. As before, when a prover P needs to authenticate to a verifier
V as the owner of s, then P and V interact through the following protocol.
Improved Version of Girault Identification Scheme
Key Generation: Random [n, k] linear code with an (n− k)× n parity-check
matrix H over Fq
– Private key: A word e ∈ Fnq of small weight w
– Public key: A public identifier s ∈ Fn−kq such that He = s
Commitments:
– P picks a random n×nmonomial matrixM , a random k×k non-singular
matrix S and a field automorphism α of Fq.
– P computes the commitments s′ = Ss and H ′ = Sα(HM).
– P sends s′ and H ′ to V.
Challenge: V chooses randomly c ∈ {0, 1} and sends it to P.
Response:
– If c = 0 then P replies by delivering α, S,M to V
– If c = 1 then P replies by delivering e′ = α−1(M−1e) to V
Verification:
– If c = 0 then V checks that Sα(HM) = H ′ and Ss = S′.
– If c = 1 then V checks that the weight of e′ is w and H ′e′ = s′.
The scheme is again a three-pass one and has to be repeated t times to reach
a security level of 1−(1/2)t. The completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge of
the scheme is a straight-forward verification of the proofs given by Girault in the
original version [3], by replacing the permutation matrix P with the monomial
matrix M and the field automorphism α (for non-prime fields) and therefore we
avoid repeating them here to save space. Note that, the scheme is again usable
in the standard model in contrast to the usual random oracle model.
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We would like also to remark, that this q-ary version of Girault’s scheme can
be used again with the family of random linear codes for any field Fq, q ≥ 5.
Moreover, we choose to commit the monomial matrix M instead of its (unique)
factorization to a diagonal matrix D and a permutation matrix P (see also sec-
tion 3) to reduce the (already) large cost of communication at each round (since
we transmit matrices) as much as possible. A promising approach to circum-
vent this drawback could be to employ random structured codes as the public
keys such as quasi-cyclic (QC) codes, similar to the work carried out in [28].
Although, there is no obvious advantage for an adversary mounting decoding
attacks on QC codes, their rich structure may lead to structural attacks even
when semi-linear code equivalence is considered (even though we are unaware of
such kind of attacks) and a more careful analysis is required before proposing
any specific parameters for the scheme.
5 A Note about Code Equivalence over Fq and Quantum
Fourier Sampling
In [5], it was shown that permutation code equivalence over Fq has a direct
reduction to a nonabelian Hidden Subgroup problem (HSP). It was further
shown in the same paper that McEliece-type cryptosystems with certain condi-
tions on the permutation automorphism groups of the underlying linear codes
used as private keys, as is the case of rational Goppa codes, resist precisely the
attacks to which the RSA and El Gamal cryptosystems are vulnerable, namely
those based on generating and measuring coset states. This fact, eliminated the
approach of strong Fourier sampling on which almost all known exponential
speedups by quantum algorithms are based. In addition, these negative results
have been extended in [33] for the case of Reed-Muller codes, which correspond
to the particular case of the Sidelnikov cryptosystem.
There are two main questions arising from this framework: Whether there
are any other families of codes suitable for cryptographic applications and what
happens when we consider a more general notion of code equivalence over Fq.
We will investigate these matters, after briefly mentioning the conditions needed
for the results of [5, 33].
Recall from [5] that a linear code C is HSP-hard if strong quantum Fourier
sampling, reveals negligible information about the permutation σ ∈ Sn of per-
mutationally equivalent codes, i.e. C ′ = σ(C). Moreover, the support of a per-
mutation σ ∈ Sn is the number of points that are not fixed by σ, and the minimal
degree of a subgroup H ≤ Sn is the smallest support of any non-identity π ∈ H.
Theorem 2 (Theorem 1, [33]). Let C be a q-ary [n, k] linear code such that
qk
2
≤ n0.2n. If |PAut(C)| ≤ eo(n) and the minimal degree of |PAut(C)| is Ω(n)
then C is HSP-hard.
We now consider Fq to be a prime field (hence Aut(Fq) is trivial) and the mono-
mial group MAut(C) of a code C ⊆ Fnq for the notion of linear code equivalence.
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Clearly, if the permutation part of MAut(C) satisfies the conditions of theorem
2, so does its closure C̃ (see definition 5) which is a code of length (q− 1)n over
the same field. Recall that two codes are linearly equivalent if and only if their
closures are permutationally equivalent (c.f. theorem 1). In other words, the in-
stances of codes that are HSP-hard for the Permutation Code Equivalence
problem remain HSP-hard for the Linear Code Equivalence. This remark,
would further imply that someone could design a McEliece-type cryptosystem by
considering a monomial transformation of the private key instead of just a per-
mutation without having to worry about attacks originating from the quantum
Fourier sampling, based on rational Goppa codes over Fq for instance. However,
we should note that these results apply only to high-rate [n, k] codes over Fq (as
qk
2
≤ n0.2n must be satisfied).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented an analysis of the hardness of the Code Equiva-
lence problem over Fq when the equivalence mapping is an isometry and not
just a permutation of the code support. The hardness of the latter problem is of
great importance when designing cryptographic primitives, such as public-key
cryptosystems and identification schemes in the field of code-based cryptogra-
phy. We stated the weaknesses of such an identification scheme (Girault’s zero-
knowledge protocol), and presented an improved version which relies on exactly
these instances of the code equivalence that the problem is believed to be hard
on average. Finally, we showed that some negative results regarding the possi-
bility of attacking McEliece-type cryptosystems with quantum algorithms based
on Fourier sampling apply also for other notions of code equivalence, besides the
permutation equivalence, subject to certain conditions on the underlying family
of codes used as private keys.
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